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Abstract  
In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas 
Silins (2005), and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More 
precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main 
assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response 
focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second 
line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which 
I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of 
counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an 
imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are 
shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair 
Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of 
armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.  
  
0. INTRODUCTION1  
There is little consensus, among philosophers, on what evidence is. Following Silins 
(2005), I will here cash out the disagreement over the notion of evidence as being 
represented by the opposition between Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. 
While philosophers have dedicated lots of attention to the Internalism-Externalism debate 
                                               
1 I would like to thank Aidan McGlynn, Duncan Pritchard, Lukas Schwengerer, and Martin Smith for reading 
and commenting on different versions of this paper, and for extremely useful discussions on this topic. I 
have presented part of this paper at the XXV SIUCC SEFA’s Workshop on Timothy Williamson at University 
of Valencia, and at the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy 2016. I would like to thank all those who attended 
those events and, in particular, Cameron Boult, Tommaso Piazza, and Timothy Williamson for useful 
feedback provided in those occasions. I would also like to thank Jaakko Hirvelä and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, 
whose feedback helped me addressing some of the reviewer’s concerns. Finally, I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for very thorough and useful comments that have enabled me to improve this paper. 
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 758539. 
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over epistemic justification, the Internalism-Externalism debate over the notion of 
evidence is still widely overlooked.  
Let internal twins share all non-factive mental states. According to Evidential 
Internalism, necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. 
By contrast, Evidential Externalism allows internal twins to differ in what their evidence 
is. That is, according to Evidential Externalism, it is possible that: A and B are internal 
twins, and A and B do not have the same evidence (Silins, 2005: 376-77). 2  
In his ‘Deception and Evidence’, Silins claims that there is an argument showing that 
“Evidential Externalism is false because it has unacceptable consequences about what one 
knows from the armchair” (Silins, 2005: 380). More precisely, Silins’ target is a specific 
variety of Evidential Externalism, namely, Timothy Williamson’s E=K, which equates 
one’s evidence to one’s knowledge (Williamson, 2000). Following Silins, I will here focus 
on Williamson’s E=K. 3, 4   
Silins’ argument aims to show that, given a (allegedly) plausible thesis about what we 
can know from the armchair, E=K leads to the unacceptable conclusion that we can have 
armchair knowledge of specific empirical propositions. Call this the Armchair Access 
Problem. In this paper, I argue that Silins’ Armchair Access Problem does not represent a 
challenge for Williamson’s E=K, for it relies on an account of armchair knowledge that 
Williamson should reject. First, I reconstruct Silins’ argument (Section 1), and I shed light 
on the nature of its main assumption (Sections 2). Second, I develop two lines of response, 
both of which put pressure on Silins’ Armchair Access thesis. While the first response 
focuses on the scope of the thesis (Section 3), the second response focuses on its nature 
(Section 4). The second line of response represents the framework within which I develop 
a novel account of second-order knowledge through imagination. After resisting a possible 
objection to my argument (Section 5), I point out that these two lines of response are 
mutually supportive and jointly compatible. I thus conclude that the Armchair Access 
Problem does not represent a threat for Williamson’s variety of Evidential Externalism, 
i.e., E=K (Section 6).  
                                               
2 Henceforth, when I refer to Externalism, I have in mind what here I call, following Silins, Evidential 
Externalism, rather than more traditional varieties of externalism about epistemic justification, e.g., process 
reliabilism. For an overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and 
Evidential Externalism see Fratantonio (forthcoming).  
3 Notoriously, Epistemological Disjunctivism, formulated in terms of evidence, is subjected to a similar Access 
Problem. See Pritchard (2012: 46).   
4  In his Deception and Evidence, Silins develops two more arguments against E=K, i.e., the so-called 
“Supervenience Argument”, and a novel skeptical argument. See Fratantonio and McGlynn (2018) for a 
response to those arguments. 
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1. THE ARMCHAIR ACCESS PROBLEM  
The variety of access argument that represents the focus of my paper is one which does 
not rest on the following Luminosity thesis:  
  
[Luminosity]: For any proposition P, if one is suitably alert and conceptually 
sophisticated, then one is in a position to know whether or not one’s evidence includes 
P. (Silins, 2005: 380)  
  
The access problem I will address here is one that arises even if we accept Williamson’s 
thesis that whether p is part of one’s evidence is not a luminous condition. That is, even if 
we grant that it is not the case that if E is part of one’s evidence, then one is always in a 
position to know that E is part of one’s evidence. Silins is well aware of Williamson’s anti-
luminosity argument. 5 In fact, he explicitly takes his Armchair Access Problem to be a 
“novel access argument which uses a very different thesis, one which is not touched by 
Williamson’s argument against [luminosity]” (Silins, 2005: 380). As Silins points out, while 
the luminosity thesis represents a very strong claim about what one can have access to, this 
novel argument relies, as we will see shortly, on a weaker and more plausible claim, one 
which is compatible with the limited nature of one’s knowledge of one’s evidence. Let us 
now see how the argument goes.  
Let us imagine an agent, Gary, who is in a room staring at a dial. Gary sees that the dial 
reads 0.4. Let us assume Gary is in a perceptually good case6. By seeing that the dial reads 
0.4, he thereby comes to know that the dial reads 0.4. Crucially, if E=K is true, then the 
proposition that the dial reads 0.4 belongs to Gary’s evidence. Let us now assume that 
Gary considers what evidence he has. The Armchair Access Problem against E=K runs – 
schematically – as follows:  
                                               
5 The target of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, as presented in Knowledge and Its Limits, is all non-
trivial conditions, where a condition is trivial when either it always obtains, or it never does. However, I will 
here narrow my focus on the non-trivial conditions concerning knowledge and evidence. 
6 I take a perceptually good case to be a paradigmatic good case in which the subject S has a veridical 
experience, her perceptual capacities are reliable and fully functioning, no luck is involved, etc. That is, one 
in which S obtains perceptual knowledge. 
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(1) Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the 
dial reads 0.4.  
(2) Gary has armchair knowledge that, if his evidence includes the proposition that 
the dial reads 0.4, then the dial reads 0.4.  
So,  
(3) Gary is in a position to have armchair knowledge that the dial reads 0.4 (Silins, 
2005: 382).  
  
The foregoing argument is grounded on the following thesis about what we can know from 
the armchair:  
  
(Armchair Access): It is sometimes the case that: one’s evidence includes some 
proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one’s evidence includes E. 
(Silins, 381-2)  
  
In a nutshell, Silins’ argument is that, given that it is sometimes possible to know, 
merely from the armchair, that a proposition p is part of our evidence, then, given factivity 
of evidence and a plausible closure principle for armchair knowledge, we can competently 
deduce, and thereby know, what this propositional evidence entails.  Given E=K, if p is 
part of my evidence, then I know that p. Therefore, assuming factivity of knowledge, if p 
is part of my evidence, then p is true. It follows that if I can know from the armchair that 
a proposition p is part of my evidence, then I can competently deduce, thereby coming to 
know merely from the armchair, that p is true. 7 But, Silins says, although “Gary can know 
what the dial reads, he cannot know such a proposition through armchair reflection” 
(Silins, 2005: 382). It’s worth noticing that Silins develops this argument as a parallel to the 
more notorious McKinsey Paradox, concerning the incompatibility between Privileged 
Access and Semantic Externalism (McKinsey, 1991). Privileged Access is, roughly put, the 
                                               
7 Note that not only is the factivity of evidence easily derived from E=K and factivity of knowledge, yet a 
priori philosophical arguments have also been provided in favor of the fact that if p is part of your evidence 
then p is true. (see Littlejohn, 2012: ch. 3)  
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thesis that one can typically know by reflection the content of one’s mental states. Content 
Externalism is, roughly put, the thesis that the content of one’s mental states is determined 
by factors in the external environment. Imagine that one is thinking that the water is wet. 
Privileged Access entails that one can know by reflection that one is thinking that water is 
wet. Content Externalism entails that if one has a thought about water, then one must have 
had interacted with H2O. Assuming one can know by reflection that Content Externalism 
and Privileged Access are true, and assuming a closure principle for reflective knowledge, 
the McKinsey Paradox aims to show that one can know by reflection a contingent fact 
about the external environment (one can know by reflection that one has interacted with 
H20), yet this is absurd.   
In what follows, I argue that Silins’ argument does not undermine Williamson’s E=K. 
In order to do so, first, I evaluate and shed light on Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge 
as underlying the Armchair Access thesis. Second, I argue that Gary’s knowledge of his 
evidence does not constitute an instance of armchair knowledge as defined by Silins.   
  
  
2. WHAT IS ARMCHAIR KNOWLEDGE?  
2.1. ON SILINS’ NOTION OF ARMCHAIR KNOLWEDGE  
To fully understand Silins’ Armchair Access Problem, we need to clarify the notion of 
armchair knowledge he employs.   
To begin with, I would like to point out that Silins’ introduction of the first premise 
is too abrupt. Silins introduces the argument by stating that “Gary has armchair knowledge 
that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4” (Silins, 2005: 382). 
Crucially, given E=K, to know what propositions belongs to one’s evidence is, first of all, 
to know what one’s knowledge is. That is, given E=K, knowledge of one’s evidence is 
nothing more than knowledge of one’s knowledge. If we then ask what is the nature of 
Gary’s knowledge that the dial reads 0.4, the answer will be straightforward. Gary’s first-
order knowledge is an instance of perceptual knowledge. Gary sees that the dial reads 0.4, 
thereby coming to know that the dial reads 0.4. But if we ask what is the nature of Gary’s 
knowledge that he knows, the answer seems to be less straightforward. The following 
worry arises: is Gary’s knowledge of his evidence, and thus Gary’s knowledge of his 
knowledge, an instance of armchair knowledge, as stated in premise (1)?  
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In order to answer this question, it is worthwhile to shed light on what it means, 
according to Silins’ formulation, to have armchair knowledge of a proposition. Silins 
defines armchair knowledge as follows:  
“One has armchair knowledge of a proposition when one knows it, and one’s 
justification for believing the proposition does not constitutively depend on one’s 
having had any particular experience or sense experience” (Silins, 2005: 380)  
  
The foregoing definition is of little help unless we get a clear idea of what the notion of 
constitutive dependency amounts to. According to Silins:  
  
“[…] one can have armchair knowledge of a proposition, even if a background 
condition for having that knowledge is that one has had a certain experience or 
type of experience. For example, one might have armchair knowledge that redness 
is a colour, even if one knows that proposition only if one has had experiences of 
redness” (Silins, 2005: 381)   
  
In order to have a better understanding of what notion of armchair knowledge 
Silins has in mind, let us consider the distinction, often used in the a priori/a posteriori 
debate, between the enabling role of experience and the evidential role of experience. The 
enabling role of experience is usually taken to be what enables us to understand the 
concepts involved in the target proposition. The latter form of experience is what is 
sometimes required, besides the enabling experience, in order for one to know a 
proposition. As Williamson says: “[e]xperience is held to play an evidential role in our 
perceptual knowledge that it is sunny, but a merely enabling role in our knowledge that if 
it is sunny then it is sunny: we needed it only to acquire the concept sunny in the first place” 
(Williamson, 2013: 293). 
Silins’ words in the above-mentioned quotation seem to suggest that, even if there 
is a sense in which one requires a certain experience (e.g., having perceived redness, having 
interacted with a linguistic community) in order to know a proposition (redness is a colour), 
this instance of propositional knowledge should be considered as being armchair 
knowledge as long as the required experience is merely enabling one to understand the 
concept involved (redness). If what Silins has in mind is that armchair knowledge is 
compatible with having had enabling experience, then to say that armchair knowledge does 
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not constitutively depend on experience is to say that it does not depend on evidential-
justificatory experience. That is, Silins seems to take armchair knowledge to be based on 
enabling experience only. 8  If it is possible to have such armchair knowledge, then, 
according to Silins, we should expect Gary’s knowledge of his evidence to be a perfect 
candidate for armchair knowledge: “we should expect that Gary knows from the armchair 
that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4” (Silins, 2005: 381).  
As mentioned above, Slins is well aware of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. 
However, even if we are not always in a position to know from the armchair what our 
evidence (and thus our knowledge) is, it is plausible to claim that we are sometimes able to 
know from the armchair what knowledge and what evidence we have. Given that Armchair 
Access is compatible with the limits of our knowledge, then everyone – including 
Williamson – would probably be on board with that. In what follows, I argue that Silins’s 
argument does not represent a challenge to Williamson’s E=K, insofar as it relies on a very 
questionable notion of armchair knowledge. More precisely, I will put forward two lines 
of response to Silins’ argument. On the first line of response, I argue that, given Silins’ 
formulation of Armchair Access, there is a plausible restriction the externalist would build 
into Armchair Access thesis, one that prevents the argument from getting going.  On the 
second line of response, I argue that, even if we grant that there is a sense in which 
Williamson should acknowledge the possibility of one’s having knowledge “from the 
armchair” of one’s evidence, this knowledge is not a problematic instance of armchair 
knowledge as understood by Silins. In order to do so, I take Williamson’s cognitive-based 
account of imagination as a framework for understanding what’s happening in Gary’s 
scenario, thereby suggesting an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. As 
I will show in the conclusion of this paper, these two lines of response are compatible and 
mutually supportive.  
  
2.2 A CLARIFICATION  
Before developing my responses, a clarification is in order. One can point out that 
there is a straightforward way of resisting the Armchair Access Problem. That is, one could 
                                               
8 Although Silins does not explicitly use this terminology, the text I’ve quoted seems to suggest, as I’ve just 
pointed out, that he has this distinction in mind. Note also that the notion of Privileged Access in McKinsey 
and in the McKinsey literature is stated as “a priori” knowledge, where this includes introspection. By 
contrast, in the a priori/a posteriori debate, introspection is generally not taken to be a priori knowledge. See 
Nuccetelli (1999), Brown (2004), and Farkas (2008) for relevant discussion.  
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argue that the conclusion (3) does not follow from the premises: Gary does not know from 
the armchair that the dial reads 0.4. 9 The reason is simply that Gary already knew that the 
dial reads 0.4 by looking at the dial (by assumption). The Armchair Access Problem would 
thus not be a genuine problem, as Gary has an empirical basis for believing that the dial 
reads 0.410. However, I believe this is not an effective response for at least two reasons. 
First, note that the validity of the Armchair Access Problem as presented by Silins, depends 
on the truth of a plausible closure principle for armchair knowledge. Anyone who resists 
the argument by claiming that the conclusion (3) fails to follow from the premises (1) and 
(2), thus also has to reject closure for armchair knowledge, while providing a satisfying 
explanation of why Gary’s empirical basis in (1) prevents the entailment from (1) to (3). 
Second, I believe this reply fails to capture the real worry underpinning the Armchair 
Access Problem.  
Everyone – including Silins – would grant that Gary originally had empirical knowledge of 
the target proposition. However, it still seems problematic to claim that he can reach 
knowledge of the same empirical proposition from the armchair. As Silins says:  
  
“[I] know that I am having a certain sense experience only if I am having the sense 
experience, but that does not show that I lack armchair knowledge that I am having 
the experience. The source of my knowledge is arguably still reflection instead of 
experience” (Silins, 2005: 381)11  
  
Analogously to the original McKinsey challenge, I believe we can appreciate the (prima 
facie) problematic nature of the Armchair Access Problem once we state it as a paradox. 
We start from a very plausible claim about what we can know from the armchair (the 
Armchair Access thesis), and from a plausible distinction between enabling and evidential 
experience, and we reach a very counterintuitive conclusion, namely, that we can gain 
knowledge of empirical propositions that is grounded on enabling experience only. Even if 
                                               
9 Thanks to Cameron Boult and Tommaso Piazza for raising this objection to me in conversation.  
10 Pritchard (2012) provides a similar response as a solution to an analogous access problem that seems to 
threaten his epistemological disjunctivism. Whether Pritchard’s response is successful or not is a topic for 
another discussion.  
11 Note that someone could further point out that what Silins is saying here is not even possible. That is, one 
could object that, in order for the source of one’s knowledge to be reflection instead of experience, one’s 
belief in the target proposition must be completely based on the non-empirical reasoning only, rather than 
on sense experience. However, I will not develop this line of response here.  
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one could (rightly) highlight Gary’s original empirical knowledge, I still believe that we 
need to say something more in order to account for the above-mentioned paradox. What 
follows should thus be conceived in the light of the paradoxical structure under which the 
Armchair Access Problem can be presented. More importantly, the rest of the paper should 
be understood in the light of the following question: what is the role experience plays in 
so-called armchair knowledge?  
  
3. A FIRST RESPONSE:  
A RESTRICTION OF ARMCHAIR ACCESS  
As seen in the previous sections, Silins’ argument relies on the following thesis 
regarding our access to our evidence:  
  
(Armchair Access): It is sometimes the case that: one’s evidence includes some 
proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one’s evidence includes E. 
(Silins 2005: 381)  
  
I have also already mentioned that Silins takes Armchair Access to be 
overwhelmingly plausible as well as compatible with Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument. We can ask: is there a restriction that Williamson, and the externalist more 
generally, could plausibly build into Armchair Access as defined by Silins? Presumably, the 
externalist would restrict Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions, 
thereby saying that we can have armchair knowledge of some instances of our evidence, but 
not of all of them. 12 Silins takes this to be an ad hoc move, something the Externalist is 
forced to do merely in order to resist the challenge. However, it is unclear why this move 
would be ad hoc. In fact, there are reasons to think the opposite is true. First, remember 
that ‘armchair knowledge’ as conceived by Silins is knowledge based on enabling experience 
only. But if this is the notion of armchair knowledge Silins has in mind, then claiming that 
we can have enabling-based knowledge of some evidence only is thus a very plausible move 
regardless of whether it resists the Access Problem or not, a move that, in fact, might also 
                                               
12 I take environmentally sensitive propositions to be propositions whose truth-value depend on how the 
environment is. By contrast, I take non-environmentally sensitive propositions to be propositions whose 
truth-value does not depend on how the environment is.  
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be made in the context of the a priori/a posteriori debate. Second, note that, by drawing a 
parallel with the McKinsey Paradox, Silins has formulated Armchair Access as a rather 
weak existential claim (i.e., Armchair Access is introduced by: “it is sometimes the case 
that”), and this is exactly what makes both McKinsey’s and Silins’ access theses look quite 
plausible. 13 Silins’ concern about the restriction being ad hoc would thus be weighty only 
if he were committed to an access thesis that has the strength of a universal claim. Finally, 
note that Silins himself points out that, unlike the more notorious Luminosity Argument, 
his novel access argument rests on a weaker access thesis, thereby focusing on how one can 
know one’s evidence, rather than putting pressure on when one can know one’s evidence 
(Silins, 2005: 380). 14 
But, if we restrict Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions, 
what are we left with? I take mathematical and logical truths to be a plausible candidate. It 
might be an open question whether visual thinking, as well as the use of external 
representations (e.g., symbols, arrows, diagrams, computer simulations, graphs) should 
seriously cast doubts on the a priori nature of mathematical knowledge. Nevertheless, the 
standard view has it that knowledge of mathematical truths generally depends on enabling 
experience only. This is highly uncontroversial. However, if this is the case, then Williamson, 
and the Externalist more generally, could thus restrict Armchair Access to non-
environmentally sensitive propositions, without leaving Armchair Access an unmotivated 
and empty claim. 15, 16 
                                               
13 In fact, as mentioned above, McKinsey’s Privileged Access is the thesis that typically one is in the position 
to know by reflection the content of one’s mental states.  
14 In Fratantonio and McGlynn (2018: 86-90), we suggest a similar, yet less developed, response. 
15 Note that it is not entirely appropriate to talk about a “restriction” of Armchair Access. As I mentioned 
above, Armchair Access is formulated as an existential claim. This is what makes it very plausible. What I 
am doing here is to pick some propositions as instances of that existential claim. However, given Silins 
himself calls this sort of move to be a “restriction” of Armchair Access, I here use his terminology.  
16 Although I believe it is very plausible to assume that mathematical and logical knowledge can be evidence 
for something, one might instead find this idea questionable. In particular, one could point out that, given 
Williamson’s account of the “evidence-for” relation, one on which e is evidence for p iff e increases the 
probability of p, mathematical knowledge can never work as evidence for a hypothesis (cf. Williamson, 2000, 
ch.9 and 10). This is because, roughly put, the probability of a mathematical truth is always 1 (by the axioms 
of probability). However, I don’t think this is a problem for the purpose of this argument. In particular, note 
that, while this problem is the result of understanding the evidential-support relation in probabilistic terms, 
E=K is a mere claim about the nature of evidence, and it does not by itself entail anything about what it takes 
for a proposition e to be evidence for p. Furthermore, note that if porbabilism about evidential-support is 
true, then nothing can be evidence for mathematical truths. This seems a problematic result and yet this does 
not depend on assuming that mathematical truths can be part of one’s evidence. This shows, once again, 
that what is problematic is probabilism about evidential-support, rather than E=K. The defender of E=K 
has thus two options here. Either she could say that mathematical knowledge does indeed belong to our 
“box of evidence”, although it cannot support any proposition (cf. Logins 2016 for a relevant discussion on 
whether this strategy could work). Or, she could embrace an alternative account of evidential support, e.g., 
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Once we realise that a plausible restriction of Armchair Access thesis to non-
environmentally sensitive propositions is available, the argument does not go through: 
given Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge, the Externalist would be happy to deny that 
Gary has armchair knowledge of the fact that his evidence includes the proposition that 
the dial reads 0.4. If Silins wants to show that E=K, when joined with Armchair Access, 
brings about the undesirable conclusion, he has to consider a different example, one which 
the Externalist would be happy to grant as a case of armchair knowledge as defined by 
Silins, namely, as a case of knowledge based on enabling experience only.   
  
4. A SECOND RESPONSE:  
ON THE NATURE OF ARMCHAIR KNOWLEDGE  
In the previous section, I have argued that Silins is too dismissive in taking any 
restriction of Armchair Access to be ad hoc. The conclusion of my first line of response 
was thus that it is far from clear why Williamson should accept the first premise of Silins’ 
argument:   
  
1) Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the 
dial reads 0.4.  
  
However, someone might not find this first line of response as intellectually satisfying 
as it should be. For one could still object that it is plausible to say that there is a sense in 
which we can sometimes know “from the armchair” what our evidence is, even when our 
evidence includes a proposition about the environment. After all, even Williamson 
explicitly allows for extended but not unlimited knowledge of our knowledge, as well as of 
our evidence. For instance, Williamson himself grants the possibility of knowledge of our 
evidence when he writes:  
  
                                               
a normic account (cf. Smith 2016), or an Explanationist account (cf. McCain 2012). Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for pointing out this potential worry to me. 
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“Our extensive but not unlimited ability to know that we know without further 
observation whether we know something is what enables us to use knowledge as 
evidence. It constitutes an extensive but not unlimited ability to know without 
further acquisition of evidence whether something is part of our present evidence.” 
(Williamson, 2000: 15)  
  
Similarly, Williamson acknowledges that, although no non-trivial mental state is 
luminous, “none of this is to deny that in favourable cases one can know without 
observation whether one is in a given mental state” (Williamson, 2000: 14). It might thus 
be tempting to argue that there is a sense in which even Williamson has to grant Gary 
knowledge of what his evidence is.  Nonetheless, as I will show in the second half of this 
paper, I believe that we should be careful in assimilating what Williamson takes to be 
“knowledge without further observation” with Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge.  
In what follows, I put forward a second line of response against Silins’ argument. 
I argue that, although we do need to account for the fact that it is sometimes possible to 
know what our evidence is merely “from the armchair”, Silins’ argument relies on a notion 
of armchair knowledge that Williamson should reject. That is, I argue that Gary’s 
knowledge of his evidence (and, given E=K, Gary’s knowledge of his knowledge) is not 
an instance of armchair knowledge as understood by Silins, namely, it is not an instance of 
knowledge depending on enabling experience only. This will enable us to resist the Armchair 
Access Problem. For reasons of simplicity, instead of directly addressing Gary’s knowledge 
of his evidence, I will consider Gary’s second-order knowledge. This is because E=K 
allows me to apply the conclusions I draw on the nature of one’s second-order knowledge 
to cases of one’s knowledge of one’s evidence.   
The main challenge taken up in this paper is to provide a plausible explanation of 
why, in cases of higher-order knowledge where one’s first-order knowledge is empirical, I 
consider second-order knowledge to not be armchair knowledge in any problematic sense. 
17 I will not defend any specific theory of second-order knowledge, for an evaluation of 
which account is the correct one is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for the 
purpose of this paper, I will consider cases in which a subject has second-order knowledge 
in virtue of: i) having first-order knowledge (assuming factivity of knowledge), and ii) 
                                               
17 Note that, in this paper, I am only concerned with cases of second-order knowledge (or higher-order 
knowledge). That is, I am interested in a person’s knowledge of her knowledge, and not in her (psychological) 
self-knowledge, understood more broadly as the person’s knowledge of her own mental states.  
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having conducted a further inquiry on her epistemic status (more precisely, on her first-
order knowledge). This further inquiry must not be empirical, and it must, of course be 
properly conducted in order to constitute knowledge. It’s important to stress that I do not 
want to suggest that second-order knowledge can only be achieved by means of a further 
inquiry on one’s epistemic status. In fact, it is plausible to think that, in some cases, one 
might be able to easily achieve second-order knowledge merely by being exposed to first 
order knowledge. 18 In Section 5, I will address more explicitly these cases of ‘easy second-
order knowledge’, and I will argue they do not constitute a threat to my overall strategy. 
However, my focus here will be mainly on cases of second-order knowledge that involve 
reflection on one’s epistemic status, for this represents Silins’ target as well. In particular, 
his being concerned with these ‘reflective’ cases of second-order knowledge is clear when 
he describes the Gary scenario. He says:  
  
“[W]e can focus on a thoughtful subject in the good case. Suppose Gary sees that 
the dial reads 0.4, and considers what evidence he has and what his having certain 
evidence entails.” (Silins, 2005: 381. Italics are mine).  
  
In the Gary scenario, Gary knows that p by having a paradigmatic visual experience that 
p. Given what I have said above, if Gary knows that he knows that p, then Gary knows 
that p and Gary has conducted a further inquiry on his epistemic status, namely, on 
whether he indeed had a paradigmatic knowledge-yielding visual experience that p. What 
follows can thus be understood as indicating a way of cashing out what this ‘further inquiry’ 
involves. In particular, I shall address two questions. First, what is the object of this 
inquiry? Second, what is the nature of this inquiry?  
Before providing an answer to these questions, I will consider Williamson’s 
imagination-based epistemology of counterfactuals and how, on Williamson’s view, the 
employment of these imaginative capacities involves experience playing a role which is 
“more than merely enabling and less than strictly evidential” (Williamson, 2016).  I will 
then go back to address the questions regarding the object and the nature of Gary’s further 
inquiry on his first-order knowledge. By developing a new application of Williamson’s 
                                               
18 Thanks an anonymous referee for addressing this concern, and to Timothy Williamson for raising a similar 
point to me in conversation. 
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cognitive-based account of imagination, namely, an imagination-based account of second-
order knowledge, I will argue that we should understand Gary’s further inquiry on his 
epistemic status as involving those imaginative capacities that Williamson takes to be in 
place when we evaluate counterfactuals, or when we come to know some propositions, 
allegedly taken to be known a priori. I will conclude that, if my imagination-based account 
of second-order knowledge is correct, then there are good reasons to believe Williamson 
would resist the major assumption of Silins’ argument: Gary’s knowledge of his evidence 
is not “armchair” in any problematic sense, namely, it is not based on enabling experience 
only. A general point can be made: once we consider seriously Williamson’s stand on the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction, Silins’ objection can be undermined. Even if there is a 
sense in which our second-order knowledge is “armchair”, namely, it is not merely 
grounded on evidential experience, it is not, however, an instance of armchair knowledge as 
underlying Silins’ interpretation of the Armchair Access thesis. That is, our second-order 
knowledge is not grounded on enabling experience only.  
  
4.1 EXPERIENCE, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND IMAGINATION  
Recently Williamson has offered an imagination-based account of epistemology of 
counterfactuals. 19 That is, he argues that in evaluating a counterfactual conditional, namely, 
in considering both its antecedent and its consequent, we employ our imaginative cognitive 
capacities. 20 In order to understand what Williamson has in mind, let us consider his own 
example as introduced in The Philosophy of Philosophy:  
  
You are in the mountains. As the sun melts the ice, rocks embedded in it are 
loosened and crash down the slope. You notice one rock slide into a bush. You 
wonder where it would have ended if the bush had not been there. A natural way 
                                               
19  See Williamson, 2007. It is worth pointing out that Williamson’s imagination-based epistemology of 
counterfactuals should be understood within Williamson’s aim of showing epistemology of metaphysical 
modalities as being a subset of the epistemology of counterfactuals. An evaluation of Williamson’s 
epistemology of metaphysical modality is beyond the scope of this paper. For criticisms, see Jenkins, C. S. I, 
(2008).  
20 It’s worth stressing that the notion of imagination here is not restricted to the Aristotelian notion of 
imagination as phantasia that might feature in dreaming and daydreaming (De Anima iii 3). Rather the notion 
of imagination at stake here is that of a broad capacity that shows itself in heterogeneity of knowledge-
yielding cognitive processes, e.g., entertaining possibilities and alternative scenarios, evaluating 
counterfactuals, and making mental comparisons (cf. Williamson 2016).  
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to answer this question is by visualizing the rock sliding without the bush there, and 
then bouncing down the slope into the lake at the bottom. Under suitable 
background conditions, you thereby come to know this counterfactual:  
[…] if the bush had not been there, the rock would have ended in the lake. 
(Williamson 2007a: 142; Italics added)  
  
What underpins Williamson’s evaluation of the foregoing scenario is the idea that 
imaginative exercises are knowledge-yielding cognitive processes that involve “a general 
human capacity to transpose ‘online’ cognitive skills originally developed in perception into 
corresponding ‘offline’ cognitive skills subsequently applied in imagination” (Williamson, 
2013: 296). 21, 22 Without performing any kind of empirical experiment, one can come to 
know a counterfactual by “visually” imagining its antecedent in one’s mind and by 
spontaneously developing its consequent. These two moments in the evaluation of a 
counterfactual mirror, on Williamson’s view, the two moments involved in our imaginative 
exercise: a first one in which imagination is exercised voluntarily, and a second one in which 
it is employed involuntarily. The former modus operandi of imagination is exercised when we 
make ourselves imagine a possible scenario. That is, we voluntarily consider a specific 
possibility and we try to imagine what would happen if we were in that possible scenario. 
However, the imagination works involuntarily when it comes to fill the target possible 
scenario with details. In Williamson’s words:  
  
“[H]aving forced the initial conditions, [one] lets the rest of imaginative exercise 
unfold without further interference” (Williamson, 2016: 116)  
  
But what enables one to “involuntarily” develop the consequent of a counterfactual in such 
a way that it produces knowledge? That is, what makes imagination a knowledge-yielding 
cognitive process? On Williamson’s view, our imagination is always constrained by our 
                                               
21 Similar ideas can also be found in Williamson 2007, 2016.  
22 Unfortunately, Williamson leaves the notion of “offline” rather unexplained in his texts. However, it is 
plausible to understand Williamson’s use of the notion of “offline” to be similar to the notion used by 
defenders of simulation theory (e.g., Goldman, 1989). That is, the imagination is the result of “offline” 
cognitive skills insofar as, roughly put, these cognitive skills work with surrogated and idealised situations 
and they can be employed in the absence of the actual object/scenario imagined. This also involves the idea 
that one can update one’s belief even in the absence of the new evidence. See Williamson, 2007, 2016.  
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background knowledge, where this includes our past experiences. More precisely, our past 
experiences determine the operation of imagination in at least two ways. 23 First, when 
addressing the imagined scenario, our ‘offline’ cognitive skills minimise the changes with 
respect to our background knowledge of similar cases. That is, the imagined scenario 
remains tuned with how reality is. Second, our background knowledge has a causal role in 
our evaluation of the counterfactual. That is, when spontaneously developing the possible 
scenario in the light of our background knowledge, the way in which our imagination 
operates is reality-oriented. This is what makes imagination a reliable and predictive 
cognitive process. In fact, it is in virtue of its being constrained by previous experiences 
that the imagination is selective and truth-oriented, thereby “spontaneously” developing 
the possible scenarios in question. 24,25 In the epistemology of counterfactuals, and in our 
imaginative exercises in general, sense experience thus plays an important role. As 
Williamson writes:  
  
“[I]n our imagination-based knowledge of counterfactuals, sense experience can 
play a role that is neither strictly evidential nor merely enabling. For, even without 
serving as part of our total evidence, it can mold our habits of imagination and 
judgment in ways that go far beyond a merely enabling role.” (Williamson, 2007: 
165)  
  
To sum up: given Williamson’s cognitive-based account of imagination, sense 
experience plays an interesting epistemic role in imagination. Although not being strictly 
evidential, experience seems to play a role that is more than merely enabling one in 
understanding the concepts involved in the counterfactual. Given the less than strictly 
evidential yet more than merely enabling role that experience plays in the employment of our 
                                               
23 Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for stressing this point.  
24 It is important to point out that although imagination is reality-oriented, it is far from being an infallible 
way of gaining knowledge. Nonetheless, the reliability of this cognitive capacity is enough, on Williamson’s 
view, to become of necessary use in our daily life, for example, as applied in our decision-making, or in the 
activity of mindreading, as well as in the way we gain knowledge about the future.  
25 I believe that Goldman’s simulation theory (1989, 2006) can offer a framework for a better understanding 
of Williamson’s account of imagination. For instance, Goldman explicitly links imagination to simulation by 
defining the so-called enactment-imagination: “Enactment-Imagination is a matter of creating or trying to 
create in one’s own mind a selected mental state, or at least a rough facsimile of such a state, through the 
faculty of imagination” (Goldman, 2006). However, I take our imaginative capacities to be something 
broader than what Goldman takes our simulative capacity to be. See also Gordon (1986) and Heal (1986) 
who were the first ones to propose simulation as an account of human psychology.  
     
 17  
imaginative capacities, and given the imagination-based epistemology of counterfactuals 
that Williamson defends, it follows that, on Williamson’s view, knowledge of 
counterfactuals should not be classified as being a priori, nor a posteriori. The point can 
thus be generalised to any instance of knowledge involving our imaginative capacities. 26 
As a consequence, given that much of the knowledge traditionally thought of as a priori 
involves the employment of our imaginative capacities, it actually fails to fit within that 
category, for experience plays a role that is more than merely enabling. 27 An example is 
provided in ‘How Deep is The Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori 
Knowledge?’, where Williamson considers the following two truths:  
  
a.) All crimson things are red  
b.) All recent volumes of Who’s Who are red.  
  
As Williamson points out, the standard view classifies one’s knowledge of a.) as a priori 
knowledge, and one’s knowledge of b.) as a posteriori knowledge. However, he argues that 
the cognitive process underlying one’s knowledge that a.) and the cognitive process 
underlying one’s knowledge that b.) are almost the same (Williamson, 2013). More 
precisely, he argues that what underlies one’s knowledge in both cases is an imaginative 
process. As a consequence of his cognitive-based epistemology of imagination just 
described, Williamson argues that the experience plays a similar role both in one’s 
knowledge of a.) as well as in one’s knowledge of b.). On the standard view, one’s 
knowledge of a.) relies on enabling experience only, thereby constituting a priori knowledge, 
while one’s knowledge of b.) relies on evidential experience, thereby constituting an instance 
of a posteriori knowledge. Contra the standard view, Williamson argues that the role that 
experience plays, both in one’s knowledge of a.) and in one’s knowledge of b.), is “more 
than pure enabling and less than strictly evidential”. On the one hand, in one’s knowledge 
of a.), the experience of redness not only enables one to understand the proposition a.), it 
also provides one with the “skills in applying the terms ‘crimson’ and ‘red’ to the point 
                                               
26 For relevant discussion on the evidential-justificatory role of imagination see, for example, M. Balcerak 
Jackson (2016), (Forthcoming).  
27 Williamson further claims that this shows that the a priori/a posteriori distinction lacks any relevant 
explanatory power. I do not want to commit myself to such a claim here.  
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where he could carry out the imaginative exercise successfully”. On the other hand, in 
one’s knowledge of b.), the only role the experience plays is that it grounds “his skill in 
recognizing and imagining such volumes” (Williamson, 2013: 297).   
  
4.2  SECOND-ORDER KNOWLEDGE THROUGH IMAGINATION  
In the previous section, I have reconstructed Williamson’s account of imagination 
and how it is widely involved in different ways in our daily epistemic practices, e.g., in our 
evaluation of counterfactuals. I have pointed out how, on Williamson’s view, imagination, 
broadly understood as one of our cognitive capacities, is sensitive to our past experiences: 
in our imaginative exercises, sense-experience plays a role which, although less than strictly 
evidential, is more than merely enabling.   
Where does this leave us? In this section, I argue that Gary’s knowledge of his 
evidence (and hence, his knowledge of his knowledge) involves the evaluation of 
counterfactual conditionals, and hence the employment of imaginative exercises. That is, 
first, I argue that we should understand second-order knowledge as partly entertaining and 
mentally visualising error-possibilities; second, I argue that, given the more-than-enabling role 
experience plays in the imagination, and given my imagination-based account of second-
order knowledge, Gary’s knowledge of his knowledge does not represent an instance of 
armchair knowledge in a problematic sense. Given E=K, the same conclusion can be 
applied to Gary’s knowledge of his evidence. Crucially, if this is so, the Armchair Access 
Problem does not represent a threat for E=K. Even if it is true that there is a sense in 
which Gary has “knowledge from the armchair” of what his evidence is, Gary’s knowledge 
is not an instance of armchair knowledge as understood by Silins, and as underlying the 
Armchair Access thesis.  
Remember that we are concerned here with a case of second-order knowledge in 
which Gary is a thoughtful subject. That is, Gary has second order knowledge that the dial 
reads 0.4 in virtue of the following two things: i) he has first-order knowledge that the dial 
reads 0.4; ii) he has conducted a further inquiry on his first-order knowledge. 28 In the 
previous section, I have addressed the following two questions: first, what is the object of 
this further inquiry? Second, what is the nature of this inquiry? Providing an answer to the 
                                               
28 I am here assuming failure of the KK-principle as originally defended by Hintikka (1962). Daniel Greco 
(2014) has recently offered a novel defense of the KK-principle. However, the vast majority of 
epistemologists would reject such a principle nowadays. In particular see Williamson (2000).  
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first question will enable us to answer the second question, thereby shedding light on why 
Gary’s first-order knowledge is empirical, yet his second-order knowledge is not an 
instance of armchair knowledge as intended by Silins.  
In the scenario originally described, Gary knows that the dial reads 0.4 simply by 
looking at it. For Gary to conduct a further inquiry on his epistemic status means to check, 
without further empirical inquiry, whether he indeed had a knowledge-yielding visual 
experience. That is, Gary will consider whether the conditions for a paradigmatic good 
case of perceptual knowledge obtained. For example, he will consider whether his sight 
was good or not at the moment of the perceptual experience, whether the lights in the 
room were good, and so on. In a nutshell, for Gary to conduct a further inquiry on his 
epistemic status (in order to determine whether he had knowledge of a specific empirical 
proposition p), is to conduct a further inquiry on whether his visual experience that p was 
a reliable one, thereby constituting a knowledge-yielding process.  
It is important to stress that, as I mentioned above, this further inquiry must not 
involve any empirical check in the environment, yet it must be put forward merely “by 
reflection” alone. If this is so, then what, in practice, does it mean for Gary to conduct this 
further inquiry on the reliability of his visual experience? It means that Gary would 
probably consider the possibility of having had a non-reliable and non-paradigmatic visual 
experience. In practice, by addressing error-possibilities, Gary would consider what would 
be the case, if he had not had a paradigmatic visual experience. In addressing this 
possibility, he would appeal to his background knowledge and he would try to remember 
previous cases in which he had a visual experience of a dial, perhaps in the same room, or 
in a different room. He would then make a comparison between past experiences and the 
visual experience he has just undergone. That is, he would “make up his mind” on his 
epistemic situation without conducing any further empirical check. Gary’s further inquiry 
would thus consist of addressing and evaluating counterfactual conditionals such as the 
following:   
  
If I had not had a paradigmatic visual-experience of a dial reading 0.4, then it would not look like there 
was a dial reading 0.4 29  
  
                                               
29 I am here ignoring any skeptical hypothesis.   
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But, as I have said above, evaluating such a counterfactual involves considering error-
possibilities, mentally visualising past experiences and making comparisons with recent 
ones.  
We can now go back to the second question I have addressed: what is the nature 
of this further inquiry? Given the above description of what Gary’s second-order 
knowledge involves, I suggest we should understand Gary’s inquiry on his epistemic status 
(required in order for him to have second-order knowledge) as involving the employment 
of those imaginative capacities that Williamson takes to be involved in our evaluating 
counterfactuals. In fact, as described in the above scenario, Gary seems to conduct this 
required inquiry by using much of the imaginative exercises that Williamson has taken to 
represent specific instances of the more general and heterogeneous cognitive capacity of 
transposing skills “offline”. Crucially, I have pointed out that, according to Williamson, the 
employment of imaginative exercises is constrained by past experiences in such a way that 
makes imagination relying on more-than-enabling experience. It follows that Gary’s second-
order knowledge involves cognitive capacities relying on experience that does not merely 
have an enabling role. Although Gary’s past experience fails to have a strictly evidential 
role, it still constrains Gary’s imaginative process in a significant way. But, if Gary’s second-
order knowledge is not relying on merely enabling experience, then it is not an instance of 
armchair knowledge as understood by Silins. That is, it is not an instance of armchair 
knowledge in any problematic sense. Given E=K, the same can be said about Gary’s 
knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4.  
  
 4.3  WHY KNOWING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE  
ARMCHAIR IS NOT ABSURD  
In the previous section, I have put forward a second line of response against Silins’ 
Armchair Access Problem. I have questioned the main assumption underlying Silins’ 
argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. I have argued that, although Gary’s 
knowledge of his evidence is not empirical, it is not “armchair” in any problematic sense: 
Gary’s inquiry on his epistemic situation is somehow constrained by experience, where this 
plays a quasi-evidential role. More precisely, along this second line of response, I have 
questioned the nature of Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge as underlying the Armchair 
Access thesis. The Armchair Access Problem mistakenly relies on a picture according to 
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which the enabling and the evidential role experience can play are mutually exclusive. There 
is, instead, a third role experience can play, one that is neither strictly evidential, nor merely 
enabling. I have argued that, once we take seriously Williamson’s cognitive-based 
epistemology of imagination, and once we see how pervasive the employment of this 
cognitive capacity is, then we can think of a plausible imagination-based account of 
second-order knowledge (and, thus, of knowledge of one’s evidence). What follows is that, 
even if there is a sense in which Gary has “armchair knowledge” of what his evidence is, 
Gary’s knowledge of his evidence is based on this third quasi-evidential role of experience, 
thereby failing to bring about any disastrous conclusion. As Williamson says:  
 
“[I]t should be no surprise if we turn out to have armchair knowledge of truths 
about the external environment.” (Williamson, 2007: 269)  
  
Before considering whether cases of “easy” second-order knowledge (i.e., cases that do not 
involve any inquiry) might affect my overall argument, let me make a final remark on a 
potentially interesting application of my imagination-based account of second-order 
knowledge. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Armchair Access Problem is developed 
by Silins as a parallel to the McKinsey Paradox which establishes a tension between 
Content Externalism and Privilege Access. Now that we have a way of resisting the 
Armchair Access Problem, one might thus wonder whether a similar response is also 
available to the Content Externalist in order to escape the McKinsey Paradox. That is, 
perhaps the Content Externalist could accept that one can know by reflection contingent 
facts about the external environment, whilst arguing that this is not a problematic result, 
insofar as this ‘reflective knowledge’ is based on quasi-evidential experience. 30  This 
potential line of response is one that deserves careful examination and that I have no time 
to address here. Nevertheless, I believe it is an option worth exploring in the future.  
  
                                               
30 For an interesting response to the McKinsey Paradox that accepts the conclusion of the paradox while 
arguing that it is not absurd see Sawyer (1998). See Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2006) for an argument showing 
that a large class of McKinsey-style paradoxes are dialectically flawed. See also McKinsey’s (2006) for 
McKinsey’s response to Lasonen-Aarnio, and Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) for a response to McKinsey’s 
response. For a useful survey of the various responses to the McKinsey Paradox see Kallestrup (2011, 2012: 
ch. 5).  
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5. EASY SECOND-ORDER KNOWLEDGE  
It could be objected that my account of second-order knowledge is not very plausible 
after all. One could argue, for instance, that no epistemic work is required for one to have 
second-order knowledge. According to this line of thought, my explanation of Gary’s 
scenario would thus fail to show that Gary’s knowledge of his evidence (and thus of his 
knowledge) is based on more than merely enabling experience. For, if Gary is able to gain 
second-order knowledge without engaging in counterfactual thinking, and without 
dismissing error-possibilities, then it seems Gary is not employing his imaginative capacities 
after all. But remember that my conclusion that Gary’s second-order knowledge is 
grounded on quasi-evidential experience is a consequence of the fact that, as the story goes, 
it is plausible to take Gary as employing his imaginative capacities. The worry would thus 
be that, if second-order knowledge does not require a further epistemic inquiry, yet it 
comes “for free” together with first-order knowledge, then Silins seems right after all: 
Gary’s knowledge is supposedly based on enabling experience only. In Section 4 of this 
paper, I have already noted that my account is compatible with the fact that there might 
be cases in which one can gain second-order knowledge easily by merely being exposed to 
one’s first-order knowledge. Furthermore, I have pointed out that the cases Silins himself 
is interested in are cases in which the target subject is thoughtful, and in which he actively 
considers what evidence he has and what his evidence entails (Silins, 2005: 381). In this 
section, I argue that, even if one insisted that we should read Gary’s second-order 
knowledge as not involving any inquiry, this interpretation of Gary’s case would still fail to 
constitute a real threat to my response. First of all, if, as one might argue, one’s second-
order knowledge comes almost “for free” together with one’s first-order knowledge, then 
the following question arises: what is this second-order knowledge grounded on? One 
plausible answer could be that our second order-knowledge is rooted in the same epistemic 
basis our first-order knowledge is grounded on. However, if this turned out to be the most 
plausible account of second-order knowledge available, I would happily bite the bullet here, 
for it would basically concur with my conclusion that, contrary to what Silins claims, Gary’s 
second-order knowledge is based on more than merely enabling experience. In fact, if this 
account of second-order knowledge is correct, we would have even a more direct response 
to Silins, given that Gary’s second-order knowledge would turn out to be just as empirically 
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based as his first-order knowledge is. 31 A different way of answering my question could be 
to say that Gary’s second-order knowledge does not require any further inquiry, and, at the 
same time, is not epistemically based on the same empirical ground on which Gary’s first-
order knowledge is based. Crucially, defenders of this account owe us an explanation of 
where this second-order belief is gaining the justificatory support needed for this belief to 
constitute knowledge. Moreover, even if a plausible explanation is provided, I believe it 
would not affect my overall argument. On the one hand, all I wanted to argue for is that 
there is a plausible explanation of how we sometimes acquire knowledge of what our 
evidence is (and hence of our knowledge), one that sheds light on the role experience plays 
in these cases of second-order knowledge. It follows that, even if there can be cases in 
which one gains second-order knowledge without conducting any active inquiry on one’s 
epistemic status, what matters is that this second-order knowledge is not based on merely 
enabling experience only. On the other hand, my account does not completely rule out 
cases of second-order knowledge that are genuine instances of “armchair knowledge” as 
intended by Silins. In fact, I take section 4 of this paper to show exactly this.  
  
6. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, I have considered Silins’ Armchair Access Problem. This is supposed to 
represent a novel access argument against E=K, one which does not rely on a luminosity 
claim. The argument aims to show that E=K is jointly incompatible with Armchair Access, 
i.e., the thesis that it is sometimes possible to know from the armchair what our evidence 
consists of. Williamson’s E=K, together with Armchair Access, seems to lead to the 
disastrous conclusion that it is possible to have armchair knowledge of a specific empirical 
proposition. Given that Armchair Access is a very plausible claim, the argument (allegedly) 
represents a reductio ad absurdum of E=K.  
This paper has rejected the Armchair Access Problem as a genuine problem for 
E=K. 32 More precisely, I have put forward two lines of response. According to the first 
                                               
31 One might also worry that the story I have provided, one that understands second-order knowledge as 
involving evaluation of counterfactual conditionals, is incompatible with Williamson’s “knowledge-first” 
project. However, note that in The Philosophy of Philosophy Williamson extensively argues for his epistemology 
of counterfactuals within a knowledge-first framework. Here I am just applying that framework to cases of 
second-order knowledge.  
32 Silins’ paper has been very influential within the epistemological debate on Externalism and Internalism 
about evidence. However, most of the discussion that followed his Deception and Evidence mainly focused on 
his so-called ‘Supervenience Argument’ and his novel Sceptical Argument. For relevant discussion on these 
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line of response, Silins’ formulation of Armchair Access as an existential claim allows for 
a plausible restriction of Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions. 
Williamson should thus reject the first premise of Silins’ argument, thereby claiming that 
Gary does not have armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that 
the dial reads 0.4.  According to the second line of response, everyone – including 
Williamson – should grant that there is a sense in which Gary can know “from the 
armchair” that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4. However, 
Gary’s second-order knowledge is not an instance of armchair knowledge as underpinning 
Silins’ Armchair Access Problem. In fact, the Armchair Access thesis as understood by 
Silins, relies on the assumption that experience can play either an enabling or an evidential 
role, where these roles are mutually exclusive. That is, Silins’ formulation of Armchair 
Access overlooks the possibility of experience having a third role: one that is more than 
merely enabling and less than strictly evidential (what I have called quasi-evidential). 
Furthermore, I have offered an explanation of why I believe Gary’s knowledge of what his 
evidence is (and thus, given E=K, knowledge of one’s knowledge) represents an instance 
of knowledge based on quasi-evidential experience. More precisely, I have argued for a 
novel imagination-based account of second-order knowledge, one according to which we 
gain second-order knowledge by means of evaluating counterfactual conditionals, thereby 
employing our imaginative exercises. Crucially, if we take seriously Williamson’s cognitive-
based account of imagination, according to which imagination relies on more than merely 
enabling experience, then we are forced to rethink the role experience plays in second-
order knowledge. Second-order knowledge seems to rely on experience that, although less 
than strictly evidential, plays more than a mere enabling role.  
Finally, let me highlight why these two lines of response are compatible and 
mutually supportive. If we understand “armchair knowledge” as knowledge based on 
enabling experience only – as Silins understands it – then Williamson should be happy to 
accept the Armchair Access thesis, while saying that one can only have armchair knowledge 
of non-environmentally sensitive propositions. It follows that Gary does not have armchair 
knowledge of the fact that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4. 
                                               
arguments see Kennedy 2010, Dunn 2012, McGlynn 2014, and Fratantonio and McGlynn 2018. Less 
attention has been devoted to the Access Problem. Nevertheless, Littlejohn (2011) constitutes an exception. 
Note that my response differs from the one provided by Littlejohn for various reasons. In particular, while 
Littlejohn rejects any accessibility requirement motivating Armchair Access, this paper shows that it is in fact 
possible for the Externalist (or at least for the defender of E=K) to accommodate the intuition that we can 
often have knowledge merely “by reflection” of what our evidence consists of.  
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This is what the first line of response has shown. At the same time, Williamson could grant 
that there is a sense in which Gary has knowledge “from the armchair” of what his evidence 
is, while rejecting the idea that Gary has armchair knowledge (as defined by Silins) of the 
target proposition. The conclusion (3) that Gary knows merely “from the armchair” the 
specific empirical proposition that the dial reads 0.4 thus follows from the premises (1) and 
(2). However, this does not represent a disastrous consequence, for Gary’s knowledge is 
based on more than mere enabling experience. This is what the second line of response 
has shown. The moral of the story is that the Armchair Access Problem rests on an 
ambiguity over the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning its main assumption (i.e., 
Armchair Access thesis). Once we get clear on which notion of armchair knowledge we 
are considering, we realise that the Armchair Access Problem does not represent a serious 
challenge for E=K.  
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